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UNDERSTANDING CATEGORISATION: 
AN EXPERIENTIALIST PERSPECTIVE 
Jennifer Sampson 
Department of Information Systems 
University of Melbourne 
Melbourne, Australia 
ABSTRACT
A considerable amount of research has been undertaken to establish how end users interpret, 
understand and verify data models often with the motivation of improving understanding, accuracy 
and completeness.  However, there is relatively little research examining how and why humans make 
categorisation decisions when developing information systems.  The research question addressed in 
this paper is: what is it about the human mind that allows it to categorise concepts in a particular way 
for conceptual data modelling? From a cognitive psychology perspective Lakoff’s (1987) image 
schema structures provide answers to such questions.  I argue that acknowledging such structures is 
the first step in defining an experientialist strategy for data modelling.  In addition a case example is 
used to illustrate the problems with utilising the objectivist approach to categorisation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Categorisation is the main way that we come to understand experience.  Conceptual data modelling as 
a categorisation activity is essentially a matter of both human experience (perception, motor activity 
and culture) and imagination (metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery).  One question of interest is 
how do we do this?  More specifically the research question addressed in this paper is what is it about 
the human mind that allows it to categorise concepts in a particular way for conceptual data 
modelling?  I argue that concepts are not internal representations of external reality, because there is 
no corresponding reality or categories “out there” to be mirrored.  This is in contrast to the objectivist 
paradigm which claims that concepts provide internal representations of external reality.  In sections 
two and three of this paper I will briefly describe why the classical approach to categorisation is 
inappropriate for conceptual data modelling.  Section three presents the experientialist strategy, an 
alternate approach for establishing a theoretical foundation for conceptual data modelling.  An initial 
application of this approach is presented in section four.  Finally suggestions for future research to 
empirically test the efficacy of the strategy for conceptual data modelling are discussed.   
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Ontology can be described as ‘what there is’, and relies on the use of specific terms to construct a 
description of reality.  The use of ontology as a theoretical basis for data modelling is inappropriate 
because we are not modelling reality when developing information systems, but the way information 
about reality is processed, by people (Kent, 1978).  Despite this, research has been undertaken to 
determine a theoretical foundation for data modelling based on philosophical ontologies [Wand and 
Weber 1993, Wand Storey and Weber 1999, Wand and Wang 1996, Weber 1997].  In particular, 
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Wand et al (1999) claim that the use of Bunge’s ontology is useful for enhancing the understanding 
and meaning of conceptual models.  However, little empirical research has been undertaken to 
determine whether humans interpret ontologically based representations better than a representation 
which does not conform to an ’acceptable’ ontology.  In essence they have not proposed why an 
ontologically sound model might be more understandable than one which is not.
The traditional classical view of categorisation claims that a category can be described by a set of 
defining attributes.  The classical view is based on an objectivist philosophy implying that boundaries 
of what is, and is not a category member, is clear cut.  Furthermore it is an attempt to model reality 
independent of human categorisation, however the constructs used to create the model are only a 
product of the mind.  The main problem with the classical view is how the defining attributes are 
decided upon, as almost all non-trivial categories have fuzzy boundaries.  As Kent (1978) claims “it is 
often a matter of choice whether a piece of information is to be treated as a category, an attribute, or a 
relationship”.
The basic metaphysical belief of objectivism is that categories exist in objective reality.  However, 
there are no categories of the right kind objectively “out there” and there are no words (or symbols) 
which objectively match up with categories in the world.  Bunge’s ontology based on the objectivist 
paradigm is inappropriate as a theoretical basis for conceptual data modelling because it fails to 
incorporate bodily experience and imaginative processes.  The objectivist view implies that the 
symbols of natural language have meaning because they can be explicitly related to objective 
categories.  This account of meaning fails to mention human beings – “It does not depend in any way 
on the nature of the thinking and communicating organisms, or on the nature of their experience” 
(Lakoff, 1987).
In addition problems with utilising the objectivist paradigm for data modelling are that often the need 
for meaningfulness is lost on the data modeller.  The reason may be that when developing a data 
model, the data modeller does so with her/his own understanding of what the entities, attributes and 
business rules are supposed to mean.  For this reason, the model does not seem meaningless to the data 
modeller because the entities and business rules are chosen with an intended interpretation.  However, 
the model may not incorporate an adequate nonobjectivist account of what makes the data model 
meaningful to the person(s) whose thinking is being modelled.  According to Lakoff an adequate 
theory must take into account how the content of a concept is related to bodily experience. 
3. THE EXPERIENTIALIST STRATEGY 
The theory of categorisation based on cognitive psychology is an alternate approach for establishing a 
theoretical foundation to conceptual data modelling.  In particular Lakoff (1987) describes an 
experientialist strategy, which has a central focus on meaning.  The claim is that conceptual categories 
are very different from what the objectivist view requires of them.  The experientialist approach to 
meaning contrasts to the objectivist approach whereby meaning is defined in terms of “our collective 
biological capacities and our physical and social experiences as humans functioning in our 
environment” (ibid). The purpose of the strategy is to address the central problem with objectivist 
semantics whereby linguistic structures and the concepts they relate to are expressed as symbolic 
structures, meaningless until they derive meaning through interaction with things or categories in the 
‘actual’ world (Lakoff, 1987).  The strategy recognises that a large portion of our categories are not 
categories of ‘things’; they are categories of abstract entities such as events, actions, emotions, 
governments, illnesses and social relationships. 
The experientialist strategy understands experience in the broadest sense and characterises meaning by 
the “nature and experience of the species and of communities” (Lakoff, 1987).  Experience in this 
sense is defined as everything that plays a role in the totality of human experience, for example 
genetically inherited capabilities, bodily nature, physical functioning and social organisation.  The 
strategy is concerned with explaining why the human conceptual system (organisation of categories) is 
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as it is.  The claim is that features of the conceptual system arise due to the nature of our physical 
experience, derived originally through our interaction in a physical and social environment.  Lakoff 
proposes two kinds of structure: basic level structure (refer section 3.3) and kinesthetic image 
schematic structure (refer section 3.4), these are products of our experience plus our ability to 
construct concepts especially those that fit with our innate experience. 
3.1 Idealised Cognitive Models 
If the activity of data modelling is ‘knowledge creating’ then it involves an organisation of knowledge 
by means of structures which Lakoff calls idealised cognitive models, or ICMs.  Each ICM is 
described as a gestalt, comprising four kinds of structuring principles: a propositional structure, an 
image-schematic structure, metaphoric mappings and metonymic mappings.  He describes a simple 
ICM using the English word Tuesday.  He suggests that Tuesday can be defined according to an 
idealised model that includes “the week is a whole with seven parts organized in a linear sequence; 
each part is called a day, and the third is Tuesday” (ibid).  Another example provided is the concept of 
the weekend, which he says, “requires a notion of a work week of five days followed by a break of two 
days, superimposed on the seven-day calendar” (ibid). He says that this model of the week is idealised, 
as seven-day weeks do not exist objectively in nature, but are created by people.  But again, according 
to Bunge’s ontology we cannot include such notions on a conceptual data model. 
Image-schematic 
Structure 
Idealised 
Cognitive 
Model 
Propositional 
Structure 
Metaphoric 
Structure 
Metonymic 
Structure 
Symbolic 
Structure 
Figure 1: Structuring principles of ICMs (based on Lakoff, 1987)  
Figure 1 represents the five structuring principles of ICMs. The first structuring principle (or model) is 
the propositional model; this model specifies the elements, their properties, and the associations 
amongst them.  The example provided by Lakoff is a propositional model characterising knowledge 
about fire, which would include the fact that fire is dangerous.  Whereas the second type of structure, 
image-schematic, specifies, “schematic images, such as trajectories or long, thin shapes or containers” 
(ibid).  Metaphoric models are  “mappings from a propositional or image-schematic model in one 
domain to a corresponding structure in another domain” p.114). Metonymy is the capacity to let one 
thing stand for another for some purpose, so a metonymic model can be either: social stereotypes, 
typical examples, ideal cases, paragons, generators, submodels or salient examples, that, according to 
Lakoff (1987) all produce prototype effects of some kind.  A prototype effect is where certain 
members of a category are judged more representative of the category than other members (Lakoff, 
1987). For example, “robins are judged to be more representative  of the category BIRD than are 
chickens, penguins and ostriches” (ibid. p.41) .Like Putman’s (1975) description of a stereotype as an 
idealised mental representation of a normal case, Lakoff defines social stereotypes as something that 
can be used to stand for a category as a whole, but sometimes these are recognised as not being 
accurate.  An example of a social stereotype provided by Lakoff (1987) was Robins and Sparrows are 
typical birds (p.86).  He remarks that these social stereotypes are “categories that function as 
stereotypes for other categories.  An understanding of such categories requires an understanding of 
their role as stereotypes” (ibid).
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Conceptual ICMs are characterised by Lakoff “independently of words and morphemes of particular 
languages” (p.289), however when linguistic elements are associated with conceptual elements in 
ICMs, a symbolic model results.  He concludes this discussion by writing, 
“linguistic expressions get their meanings via (a) being associated directly with ICMs and (b) having 
the elements of the ICMs either be directly understood in terms of preconceptual structures in 
experience, or indirectly understood in terms of directly understood concepts plus structural relations” 
(ibid.p.291).
If data modelling reflects some aspect of human reasoning, a corresponding cognitive semantic 
framework can be constructed using image schemas, metaphors and metonymies.  Producing 
‘meaning’ from a data model may be achieved by defining the components of the model according to 
Lakoff’s schematic structures.  Furthermore, these structures may be used to formalise the 
identification of semantic concepts described by Date (2000).  Date (2000) claimed that semantic 
modelling includes, the identification of semantic concepts, the set of formal or symbolic objects, 
general integrity rules and finally the formal operators for manipulating the formal objects. 
3.2. Concepts and Categories 
In an information system the question of what a ‘thing’ is, is its category (Kent, 1978).  We have 
categories of everything we think about.  Categories are categories of things (Lakoff, 1987).  We 
specify the set of categories to be maintained in an information system, these categories can differ 
from system to system.  The classification rules used in one system to determine a category may be 
quite different in another system.  The experientialist strategy maintains that the category of a thing 
may be determined by its position, environment, or use, rather than the set of defining attributes.  
Furthermore, bodily experience and how we use imaginative mechanisms determines how we create 
categories to understand experience.
Like Kent, Lakoff claims that there is no natural set of categories.  Categories can be characterised 
using cognitive models of five types: propositional, image-schematic, metaphoric, metonymic and 
symbolic.  Lakoff argues that cognitive semantics and the study of the general forms of metaphoric, 
metonymic and image-schematic reason can be applied to any subject matter that can be understood 
using image schemas, metaphors, and metonymies.  He demonstrates cognitive semantics that covers 
the subject matter of predicate calculus, but then argues that the resulting logic would apply to any 
subject matter that can be understood in terms of these schemas and would provide an intuitively 
meaningful semantics.  This requires that the logic would have an experientialist rather than an 
objectivist interpretation. 
Lakoff describes the notion of concepts, for example the concept flight attendant can be characterised 
relative to an airline scenario (because for every concept there can be a corresponding category).  A 
category is “those entities in a given domain of discourse that the concept (as described by the 
cognitive model) fits” (p.286).  Concepts characterised in a cognitive model using necessary and 
sufficient conditions generate classically defined categories, whereas prototype effects can arise in a 
number of ways such as: metonymy, radial categories, generative categories and graded categories. 
Cognitive models structure thought and are used when creating categories and in reasoning.  
According to Lakoff the structuring of concepts allows us to comprehend, to acquire knowledge and to 
communicate.  The structuring of cognitive models however, does not account for meaningfulness.  
The experientialist strategy claims that conceptual structures are meaningful because they are 
embodied (tied to bodily experience).  There are two kinds of structure in our preconceptual 
experiences: basic level and kinesthetic image-schematic structures:  These concepts are directly 
understood in terms of physical experience  
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3.3. Basic-level Structures 
This is the level of physical experience where we can distinguish tigers from elephants  (human 
interaction with the external environment - the basic level), described through basic gestalt perceptions 
(overall shape), motor movements and the formation of mental pictures.  Basic level concepts can be 
objects, actions or properties.
3.4. Kinesthetic Image Schematic Structures 
Kinesthetic image schemas are a form of conceptual structure in cognitive semantics (Saeed, 1997).  
Lakoff maintains that image schemas structure concepts, that is, they define most of what we mean by 
‘structure’ when we examine abstract domains.  These image schemas structure our experience of 
space.  The notion is that we form basic conceptual structures because of our physical experience of 
existing in the world (perceiving, moving, exerting and experiencing), this is how we organise 
thought.  For example, the CONTAINER schema (or class) consists of a boundary which is the 
delineation of interior from exterior (the difference between in and out).  Lakoff describes how we 
understand an enormous amount of activities in ‘container’ terms.  For example personal relationships 
can be perceived in terms of containers: ‘trapped in a marriage’ and ‘get out of’.  Whereas the PART 
WHOLE schema represents how hierarchical structure is understood and can be metaphorically 
mapped onto subclass relations.  IDENTIFICATION schema implies that all entities have a special 
property that identifies that entity.  The LINK schema relates two entities that is the relational 
structure between them.  However, the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema recognises that complex 
events have initial states (source), a sequence of intermediate stages (path), and a final state 
(destination).  The path schema recognises that everyday experience involves moving around the 
world and experiencing the movements of other entities.  This schema is perhaps most useful for 
describing events which are not usually represented in data modelling. 
Table 1 provides an initial description of how the semantics of a data model may involve metaphorical 
mappings based on relevant image schemas.  An understanding of how such metaphorical mappings 
are conceptualised by humans when creating data models may be useful for revealing different points 
of focus (alternative models) and for improving understanding and meaningfulness. 
Schema  Metaphorical Mapping Structural Elements Description 
CONTAINER Class (the world is made up of 
entities). 
The underlying schema of 
everything. 
INTERIOR,
BOUNDARY,
EXTERIOR
Each entity is represented 
structurally by a CONTAINER 
schema. 
PART-WHOLE Sub class. 
Type versus instance. 
A WHOLE, PARTS 
and a 
CONFIGURATION
All entities will have certain 
properties in common. 
IDENTIFICATION Unique identifier. IDENTITY Every entity has a special 
property that serves to identify 
that entity. 
LINK An entity can be related to other 
entity by means of 
relationships. 
Two entities, A and 
B, and LINK 
connecting them. 
To secure the location of two 
things relative to one another. 
Represents how the relational 
structure is understood. 
SOURCE-PATH-
GOAL
Intension. (Purposes is 
understood by destination. 
Purpose is understood as 
passing along a path from a 
starting point to an endpoint). 
A SOURCE, a 
DESTINATION, a 
PATH and a 
DIRECTION.
Complex events have initial 
states (source), a sequence of 
intermediate stages (path), and 
a final state (destination). 
Table 1: Image Schemas for a Data Model 
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Lakoff says that each schema has an internal structure and may be understood in terms of direct 
experience.  However, other more interesting forms of metonymic reasoning relevant to data 
modelling may be: social stereotypes, typical case, ideals, paragons, generators and salient examples.  
He remarks that these are normal activities involving the use of human reason, which involve 
“imaginative projections based on understanding an entire category in terms of some subpart of that 
category”.  Also the conceptual categories “have properties that are a result of imaginative processes 
(metaphor, metonymy, mental imagery) that do not mirror nature” (p.371).  
Using metonymy or reference-point reasoning a data modeller may determine intention. A metonymic 
model has the following characteristics: 
?? There is a “target” concept A to be understood for some purpose in some context. 
?? There is a conceptual structure containing both A and another concept B. 
?? B is either part of A or closely associated with it in that conceptual structure.  A choice of B 
will uniquely determine A, within that conceptual structure. 
?? Compared to A, B is either easier to understand, easier to remember, easier to recognise, or 
more immediately useful for the given purpose in the given context. 
?? A metonymic model is a model of how A and B are related in a conceptual structure; the 
relationship is specified by a function from B to A. (Lakoff, 1987, pp.84-85). 
These characteristics infer that B may be used to stand, metonymically, for A.  Types of metonymy 
are; social stereotypes, typical cases, ideals, paragons, generators, and salient models.  These may be 
useful classification techniques for supplementing the requirements definition phase of systems 
analysis.  The data modeller may use metonymic models to aid understanding of the problem domain.  
A social stereotype is when a judgement is made about people or a situation.  Social stereotypes 
(according to the stakeholders perception) may be used to describe parts of the data model.  However, 
Lakoff warns, “they are usually recognised as not being accurate, and their use in reasoning may be 
overtly challenged” (p.85).  Therefore, recognising when a person is using a social stereotype to 
describe a category as a whole may help avoid placing too much importance on such descriptions.  A 
typical category is when inferences from typical to atypical cases are made, based on knowledge of the 
typical.  It is very normal to categorise things in terms of typical cases, however, a ‘good’ data 
modeller would try to model typical cases as well as those cases that were atypical. 
A category can be understood in terms of abstract ideal cases which involve making judgements of 
quality and planning for the future.  According to Lakoff a lot of cultural knowledge is organised in 
terms of ideals, for example ideal jobs, ideal workers and ideal bosses.  Paragons include making 
comparisons and then using that comparison as a model for behaviour.  Generators define concepts by 
principles of extension, where the members of a category are defined or generated by the main 
members.  Salient examples include using familiar, memorable examples to understand categories.  
The data modeller may use many types of examples not only salient examples to understand the 
categories.
4 EXAMINING CATEGORISATION: A CASE IN QUESTION 
A case study was undertaken to investigate the design and use of a complex data warehouse at a 
government department (Sampson and Atkins, 2002).  In 1996/1997 a new system, AMS, was 
developed to record and manage the processing of all visa applications.  The system was custom built 
using Microsoft SQL Server 6.5 relational database management system. At the same time the data 
warehouse was built to provide better access to management information, the rationale was to improve 
the accuracy of data for business monitoring.  The source database (AMS) is very complicated due to 
the complexity involved with processing applications whilst adhering to legislative requirements.  The 
information captured in the AMS system is the source of all information for the data warehouse (MIS). 
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 The data warehouse was developed to meet the needs of three types of user groups: senior managers, 
analysts in the national office and branch managers. 
The participants in the case study were: the data warehouse designer/developer, a senior consultant, 
the IT director, a technical support user and four data consumers.  A number of interviews were 
carried out to identify factors which inhibit or prevent an in-depth understanding of semantic content 
of the data warehouse these were classified as: technical, social/cultural, training, resource, data or 
design related.  In this paper I will focus on the problems with the design of the data warehouse, that is 
design decisions regarding entity and property decisions. 
The most significant problem stemming from the underlying database design (AMS) is the fact that 
every document is handled as an application even where the documents quite obviously record 
different information.  Participant G spoke of this problem from a design point of view,  
“The data is an issue too, which is only now beginning to be sorted out, in that, it’s the way they 
handle everything as an application. But different types of applications are very different like a visitors 
visa application goes through a very different process and requires different information to a permit 
issued over the border, or a ministerial appeal”. 
Furthermore, participant E says that a lot of the data on AMS is not carried onto MIS,  
“There are occasions where you want to know the demographic characteristics of people approved 
under general skills category?  You can't actually get that information on MIS …When you're looking 
at the individual record of data it’s quite often AMS that you have to go to after you identify through 
MIS what it is you want”.   
However, he also concedes that the MIS was not originally designed with research requirements in 
mind, therefore a lot of the information he would like is not captured.  Nevertheless, participant E 
commented that MIS is not comprehensive as it “would need to be people based …as opposed to 
applications based therefore, having everything about individuals easily accessible”. 
In addition, a major complexity in the applications system is the notion of grounds codes, which at the 
logical level appear simple, but at the physical level have been designed in such a way that it makes it 
difficult for the users to select the appropriate data.  The use of structured codes in database design 
often causes flexibility problems and is generally not recommended.  For example, in AMS (and MIS) 
a grounds_code comprises three parts: application category, application type and application criteria.  
The application category code identifies whether it is a visa, a permit, an appeal or a border 
application.  The next level identifies the application type code (a type might be visitor, work, 
residence), below that at the lowest level is the application criteria code (general skills, family, 
humanitarian, family marriage).  This structure requires (of the users) an understanding of these codes, 
so the correct records are selected when performing queries on the data warehouse.  Participants G and 
F both commented that there were problems with the users understanding the complexity of the 
grounds code structure. 
The problems experienced with dealing with complexity in this model may have arisen because of the 
particular view the designers had of the problem domain.  The data model for the source database (and 
the subsequent data warehouse) was created with a focus on application as the primary entity-type, a 
view also reflected in the overall business strategy to improve application processing time and entry 
numbers into the country.  However, as the users pointed out different types of applications are very 
different, requiring different sets of information to be collected and analysed.  Problems that crept into 
the system included the ability to enter an application and an applicant twice as there was no way of 
matching multiple applications to the one person. 
An alternative approach would be to relate the problem domain to the image schemas presented at 
Table 1.  This may be achieved because we can understand the problem using basic level and image-
schematic concepts because they are directly understood in terms of physical experience.  
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Schema (Lakoff 
(1987))
Metaphorical Mapping Structural Elements Mathematical idea 
CONTAINER In this domain, the world 
is made up of people out 
of the country and people 
in the country. 
INTERIOR = individuals 
residing ‘in’ the country 
BOUNDARY = country 
border
EXTERIOR individuals ‘out’ 
of the country 
Set
e.g. Person. 
PART-WHOLE Different individuals 
with particular identities 
requiring different types 
of legal documents 
A WHOLE, PARTS and a 
CONFIGURATION
Factor (or 
decomposition) 
Person type 
Identity  
IDENTIFICATION A unique identifier to 
identify an individual 
(but one individual may 
have more than one 
identity in this domain). 
IDENTITY
(passport identification) 
Person identity  
LINK The link between the 
person and her/his 
identity (or identities).   
Person A and identity A, 
related using a surrogate key. 
Correspondence, 
Chain 
Person identity 1 
Person identity 2 
In a ‘perfect’ world 
this should be a one 
to one relationship 
and hence redundant. 
SOURCE-PATH-
GOAL
The status of potential 
immigrant to application 
under consideration to 
processed applicant. 
A SOURCE = person, a 
DESTINATION, = country A,  
PATH = procedure followed 
DIRECTION = application 
status.
Continuity 
Specific type of 
process to be 
followed depending 
on the type of 
application and 
specific set of data 
required for 
processing. 
Table 2: Person/Identity focused schema 
The schemas at Table 2 categorise the individual (or applicant) as the main entity-type through 
focusing on the container schema.  The advantage with using this holistic approach is that it reveals 
the complexity between the individual and an individuals identity.  This perspective recognises that 
there is an artificial difference between person and identity.  A typical implementation solution would 
be to create surrogate keys for the individual (Simsion, 2001).  Nonetheless this does not solve the real 
world problem of matching person A with identity A and person A with identity B.  Moreover, it does 
not answer the philosophical questions:
- what is an identity? 
- what distinguishes an individual from her/his identity? 
- do two separate identities mean we have two separate individuals? 
- is an identity specific to one individual? 
- when does identity one become identity two?  How do we capture the transformation? Is this 
necessary? 
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These questions are difficult to answer using traditional data modelling techniques.  However, in this 
case they need to formally define the term identity.  Furthermore it might be impossible to recognise a 
change in identity because in fraudulent circumstances the change may have a criminal element.   
CONCLUSION
Lakoff (1987) says that image schemas and metaphorical models are required to represent the 
meanings of expressions.  The meanings of the concepts in a data model can also be represented using 
image schemas and metaphorical models, this is because image schemas define what we mean by 
‘structure’when we talk about an abstract domain.  The image schemas described above can be 
formally defined using logic but Lakoff argues that this is not necessary because the experientialist 
strategy claims that conceptual structures are meaningful because they are embodied (tied to bodily 
experience).
This research in progress claims that categories in general are understood in terms of Container 
schemas.  However this research needs to be empirically tested to determine the efficacy of the 
strategy for data modelling.  To test the use or otherwise of the experientialist strategy we suggest a 
number of experiments that firstly, test the use of the container schema for determining the difference 
between things and properties.  Secondly an experiment which determines whether the notion of 
source-path-goal is relevant for distinguishing between entities and events.  Thirdly test the 
understanding a group of users has of a data model created using the experientialist strategy and 
fourthly to examine the cultural implications of categorisation.  
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